In recent years considerable effort has gone into understanding default reasoning Most of this effort concentrated on the question of en tailment, 1 e , what conclusions are warranted by a knowledge-base of defaults Surprisingly few works formally examine the general role of defaults We argue that an examination of this role is necessary in order to understand de faults, and suggest a concrete role for defaults Defaults simplify our derision-making process allowing us to make fast, approximately op timal decisions by ignoring certain possible states In order to formalize this approach, we examine decision making in the framework of decision theory We use probability and utility to measure the impact of possible states on the decision making process We accept a default if it ignores states with small impact accord ing to our measure We motivate our choice of measures and show that the resulting formal ization of defaults satisfies desired properties of defaults, namely cumulative reasoning Fi nally, we compare our approach with Poole's decision-theoretic defaults and show how both can be combined to form an attractive framework for reasoning about decisions We make numerous assumptions each day the car will start, the road will not be blocked, there will be heavy traffic at 5pm, etc Many of these assumptions are defeasible, we are willing to retract them given suf ficient evidence Humans naturall> state defaults and draw conclusions from default information Hence, defaults seem to play an important part in common-sense reasoning To use such statements, however, we need a formal understanding of what defaults represent and what conclusions they admit
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The problem of default entailment-roughly, what conclusions we should draw from a knowledge-base of defaults-has attracted a great deal of attention Many researchers attempt to find "context-free" patterns of default reasoning (e g , [Kraus et al, 1990] ) As this research shows much can be done in this approach We claim, however, that the utility of this approach is lim ited, to gain a better understanding of defaults, we need
In order to define defaults we need to understand when can we "safely ignore" a set of situations When we ig nore a set of situations consistent with our knowledge our expected utility calculations will only approxi mate the expected utility of actions given ip Such an approximation can lead to erroneous perception of the quality of actions, and consequently, to bad decisions We suggest that a set of states can be safely ignored if a reasonably good action is chosen even when these states are ignored Consequently we consider a default (p -4 V to be "safe" if the action we choose when wc consider only -states is a good approximation (in terras of expected utility) of the action we would choose had we considered all To implement this idea wc propose a measure on sets of states lhat captures their impact on the outcome of the decision-making process We accept the default when the measure of ipA--^ is very small relative to that of We will show that the proposed measure satisfies our stated desideratum Our measure takes into account two factors the probability of the set and the utilities of actions on this set If the probability of a set is small, then it seems that we can ignore it However, if the utilities of actions on this set are extreme as in the insurance example above, then we might not want to ignore it On tht other hand if the utilities of all actions on the set are very close then all actions look similar on this set, so we should focus on the differences among actions elsewhere The contribution of this paper is twofold First, it ad vocates a more concrete approach to the study of defaults in which a specific role for defaults is required with such a role we tan gain a better understanding of the se mantics, formal properties, and applications of defaults Second it proposes a particular role for defaults in our decision-making process and examines suitable formal semantics that fulfill this role Thus we can understand tht implication of various properties of defaults in a con crete setting we can examine how such properties affect the agent's decision-making process Moreover our se mantics grounds defaults in a well-established theorydecision theory Thus, we can use the tools provided b\ this theory when formalizing our intuitions about deci sion making It also provides common ground with other work that shares these tools In particular, we examine the relation between our defaults and statements such "if p, than a is an optimal action" that have been studied by Poole [Poole, 1992] We combine the two types of state ments in one framework, leading to a rich knowledge representation language Because Poole's work shares the fundamental notions of decision theor>, we can inte grate his approach into our framework in a semantically clean way Finally, decision-theoretic defaults supply us with a method for compiling decision theoretic informa tion into a compact form This compact form may allow for faster, albeit approximate, on-line decision making
We are certainly not the first to note the importance of utility considerations in default reasoning Similar in tuitions were mentioned in many of the early works on default and defeasible reasoning (e g , [McCarthy, 1980] ) In particular, several works use expected utility consid eration in evaluation of heuristic rules (e g , [Langlotz It is unclear to us at this stage whether system Cu is complete, or whether there are other rules that hold for this definition Notice that From CUTU and RW we can derive CUT, and from CMW and RW we can derive CM Thus, the main difference between system Cu and system C is the weaker version of right weakening These results show that the most natural definition of defaults that satisfies our decision-theoretic desiderata (.i e , being approximation safe} has very weak proper ties We consider the failure to satisfv properties of cu mulative reasoning to be a serious one Two properties of cumulative reasoning are especially important The first is the AND property AND This property is demed from s\stem C (nee [Kraus et al, 1990] ) This property deals with modularity of as sumptions It states that if we can safely assume V'i and also safely assume V'2, then we should be able to assume both This property however is not guaranteed by Defi nition 2 1 The other property is CM It states that if we happen to learn that some of our assumptions are true, we do not retract our previous assumptions Suppose, for example, that I assume by default that my CAT will start, and that it is, a sunny day If, I then learn that the day is sunnv, it seems intuitive that I should not need to retract my conclusions about the car Again, this property is not guaranteed by Definition 2 1
In general, we believe that properties of cumulative reasoning are indeed basic properties of any notion of de faults, if we do not satisfy cumulative reasoning, we must reexamine our assumptions whenever we have additional information, even if this information is consistent with our previous default conclusions Such behavior seems undesirable Thus, we would like to add the additional desideratum that accepted defaults are cumulative This leads us to ask is there a natural definition of decisiontheoretic defaults that satisfy both desiderata"* 2 2
Strong Definition
We have seen that our definition of defaults is "almost" cumulative, except that it does not satisfy RW The problem was that even if G(A) is small, it might be that G{B), for some The last section showed how to obtain cumulative rea soning in our framework Recall that preferential reason ing is denned to be cumulative reasoning combined with the OR rule Moat accepted semantics of defaults, in particular preferential structures and E-semantics, lead to preferential consequence relations Is OR satisfied m the two approaches we described 7 As the following ex ample shows, this is not necessarily the case Example 2 8
Consider the following scenario The agent is contemplating two possible investments He can either buy the stocks of company A, an oil producer, or those of company B, aplastic manufacturer The success of either investment is greatly dependent on changes in the price of oil If oil prices rise, company A's profits will increase However, since plastic is an oil by-product the cost of raw material for company B will rise and its profits will decline On the other hand if oil prices decline, company A's profits will decline and company B's profits will increase This situation is complicated by news of a technological break-through in oil refinement This technology is expected to decrease the cost of oil refinement, reducing the costs for both companies But it will have a more dramatic effect on company B by improving the quality of its raw material However this technology is still in early stages of development, and is not likely to have any effect on the market in the next few years These considerations arc captured by the following (parameterized) decision theoretic setting if the agent accepts this default, he is likely to make the wrong choice, 1 e , buy into the oil company | In retrospect, it is not too surprising that OR is not satisfied in our system The essence of OR is reasoning by cases If when holds we can assume , and when holds we can assume , then we should also assume when we know that one of these rases is true However, as noticed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, this rule might be inappropriate when we read the antecedent of the default as "I only know ' (which is basically how we interpret this default) "I only know , '' is not equivalent to "I only know " 3 Poole's decision-theoretic defaults Poole (1992) introduces a semantics for defaults that is also based on decision theory His motivation is similar to our own, \et his proposal is very different We now briefly review his semantics A default in Poole's system has the form -~* a and reads "Gnen evidence do action a' This default caches information about the best action to perform when we get evidence Such a default is accepted in a decision-theoretic context (Pr U) if a maximizes the expected utility over , that is I
Poole argues that this definition naturally captures man\ real-life defaults
He gives examples of default statements that conclude what action to perform, such as "if >ou are in Vancouver in November, carr> an um brella'
He shows that his semantics satisfies several desirable criteria, such as non-monotonierty, specificity, and ignoring irrelevant information Poole would ultimately want his semantics to capture regular defaults, such as 'birds typically fly" However, these defaults have formulas as their conclusions not actions Poole attempts to overcome this problem using the following idea With each proposition p, he asso ciates three actions These actions stand for assume that p is true assume that p is false, and do not make assumptions on p, respectively Poole then represents defaults such as 'birds typically fly' as Bird Fly 1 He shows that under certain (rather strong) assumptions on the utility of these actions, he can give accepting conditions for defaults in terms of Pr and U Poole s solution forces us to examine utilities of actions of a specific form -making assumptions It seems to us that unless we have a good model of how making assumptions affects the choice of "real" actions (l e , ac tions in the world), it LS quite difficult to assess their utility Morever, it is unclear whether such a model will satisfy requirements of Poole's analysis Our approach to defaults circumvents these problems bv examining the utility of the actual actions available to us when we face the decision Vve believe this approach is more natural In any particular context we arc facing a choice between several concrete decisions The context describes the possible outcomes these decisions can lead to and their resulting utilities
In spite of this criticism, we beheve that defaults of the form are useful, and suggest that Poole's defaults 4
Discussion
Our starting point was the thesis that knowledge representation and reasoning methodologies arc better under stood in terms of their role in determining the behavior of agents Once we have establish this role, we can gain a better understanding of the methodology in question We examined one particular role of default reasoning Focusing on this role helped us to determine desider ata that defaults should satisfy and to derive decisiontheoretic semantics for defaults that meet these desider ata Given this role, we can motivate what conclusions are entailed from a know ledge-base of defaults But more importantly, providing a role for defaults is the first step toward understanding what defaults the knowledge-base should contain in the first place As our approach sug gests, the content of the knowledge-base depends on the specific context of the agent his beliefs (1 e , probabil ity) his goals (i e utility), and the actions available to him
Our semantics grounds defaults in decision-theoretic contexts Intuitively, this is because we use wellunderstood notions (1 e , probability and utility) instead of abstract ones (e g preferential structures)
This choice allows us to relate defaults to other forms of knowledge In this paper we examined one candidate, Poole's default actions We believe that knowledge is not, m general, homogeneous It is composed of various types of statements, and clearly there are interactions be tween these statements Grounding these different types of statements in a common basis allows us to understand these interactions In our case, the interactions between Poole's defaults and ours described in Theorem 3 1 are not arbitrary they are a consequence of the semantics of both defaults in terms of decision-theoretic contexts Our definitions rely on PDCs -sequences of decisiontheoretic contexts These structures, which may not appear intuitive at first sight, should be understood as a mathematical idealization This idealization allows us to talk about very small quantities, or very big quantities, and in particular the quotient E, without committing to a particular value This point highlights an important problem in nonmonotonic reasoning as well as probabilis tic reasoning what is a an acceptable notion of approx imation' It is clear that setting a fixed threshold value is a crude way of denning approximation Similarly, the use of hunts is also quite crude For example, we do not examine the rate of convergence nor do we provide a methodology for obtaining these sequences Of course, in real applications we can often set a threshold value below which things arc considered small enough to be ignored Once we fix this threshold we accept a default when the expression in (2) (or (5)) is smaller than this threshold This definition approxi mates the notions we examined here In particular, it does not satisfy the inference rules we describe However, we can reason using these inference rules and get conclu sions that might violate the fixed error margin This pro\ides a wav of getting "fast and dirty" conclusions Such an approach has been applied in the in E-semantics liter ature, and recent work [Darwiche and Goldszimdt, 1994] indicate that such approximations might be quite useful A possible avenue of future research is to use this method in knowledge-compilation of decision-theoretic informa tion [Hennon et al, 1991] Roughly, in this method, off-line computation will generate a set of defaults us ing some parameter e These defaults (and their logical consequences) will be used at run-time to ignore various possibilities, hence reducing the amount of time spent in evaluating possible actions As with any type of approximation, there is a tradeoff between the quality of the inference made (decision in this case) and the time spent on making this inference Decision-theoretic de faults can be viewed at summarizing the information en coded in the underlying decision-theoretic context and may allow for faster on-line computations Our analysis is based on static or "one-shot" decision theory Recently, there has been much work on decision making in dynamic environments (e g , Markov Decision Processes [Puterman, 1994] )
The notion of expected utility in these models is somewhat more complicated However, similar considerations of probabdity and util ity apply when attempt to ignore various possibilities, I e , we would like to ignore a possibility if it has small impact on the quality of actions we later choose We in tend to examine notions similar to default assumptions in the framework of Markov Decision Processes and to use these result to provide fast and approximately opti-mal planning in this setting Finally, we note that the approach we examine in this paper is not the only one for justifying defaults In particular, several recent works [Pearl, 1993 , Boutiher, 1994 ] examine approaches to qualitative decision theory Roughly, these are analogues to decision theory where defaults play the role of probabilities and analogues of utility, and expected utility (1 e , a combination rule) are suggested All of these approaches are descriptive in that they espouse a particular procedure for decision-making We believe that it is important to understand the nor motive foundations of such qualitative decision theory This involves finding reasonable 'rationality postulates' (in the sense of Savage's (1954) normative foundation for decision theory) that characterize these qualitative deci sion procedures Initial results in this spirit appear in [Brafman and Tennenholtz, 1994] 
